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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A RESENTENCING GAME 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Brinson1 
(decided June 26, 2013) 
 
Two defendants, in unrelated cases, claimed that resentencing 
to include the mandatory post-release supervision to their determinate 
sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.2  The defendants claimed that their multiple sentences must be 
measured separately from one another.3  Therefore, at the time of re-
sentencing, the defendants stated that they had “an expectation of fi-
nality” because they completed the determinate portion of their sen-
tences that were subject to post-release supervision.4  The New York 
Court of Appeals held that the defendants did not have a legitimate 
expectation of finality until their aggregated sentences were complet-
ed and, until then, resentencing in order to correct an illegal sentence 
did not violate the “Double Jeopardy Clause and the prohibition 
against ‘multiple punishments.’ ”5 
I. BACKGROUND 
On July 14, 2000, Christopher Brinson was sentenced to a de-
terminate term of ten years for robbery in the second degree, an inde-
terminate term of three to six years for robbery in the third degree, 
and another indeterminate term of two to four years for grand larceny 
in the fourth degree.6  The court ordered that the indeterminate terms 
to run concurrently, but the indeterminate terms to run consecutive to 
the determinate term.7  Brinson was incarcerated for eleven years and 
 
1 995 N.E.2d 144 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 147. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 148. 
6 Id. at 145. 
7 Id. 
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four months when he was resentenced to include five years of post-
release supervision with his determinate sentence.8 
In 2004, Lawrence Blankymsee was sentenced to a determi-
nate term of five years on two counts of possession of a loaded fire-
arm, an indeterminate sentence of three to six years on other weapons 
possession counts, an indeterminate sentence of eight to sixteen years 
on two felony possessions of a controlled substance counts, and a de-
terminate sentence of one year on a misdemeanor drug possession 
count.9  Blankymsee was resentenced after six years and five months 
in order to impose five years post-release supervision for his determi-
nate sentences.10 
Under New York Penal Law § 70.45, a determinate sentence 
not only includes a term of imprisonment, but it also imposes a peri-
od of post-release supervision to follow.11  The statute, which was 
part of Jenna’s Law, was adopted by the New York Legislature in 
1998 with the intent to “abolish parole and institute determinate terms 
of imprisonment for certain felony offenses.”12  The New York Court 
of Appeals held that post-release supervision must be properly pro-
nounced by the sentencing court and a failure to do so “results in an 
illegal sentence.”13  Additionally, these illegal sentences cannot be 
administratively corrected by the Department of Correctional Service 
(“DOCS”) because it is outside of the department’s jurisdiction and 
only a sentencing judge may impose post-release supervision.14  In 
2008, the Legislature enacted Correction Law § 601-d to be used as a 
device for the court to consider resentencing defendants who were 
serving determinate sentences but did not receive post-release super-
vision in their original sentence.15  Additionally, this law was enacted 
to allow the DOCS to notify sentencing courts that post-release su-
pervision was not included in the original sentence and that the de-
fendant should be resentenced to include post-release supervision.16 
In People v. Brinson, Brinson and Blankymsee challenged the 
 
8 995 N.E.2d at 145-46. 
9 Id. at 146. 
10 Id. 
11 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (McKinney 2011). 
12 People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878, 881 (N.Y. 2010). 
13 Id. 
14 Matter of Garner v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 889 N.E.2d 467, 469-70 
(N.Y. 2008). 
15 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 881. 
16 Id. at 884. 
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constitutionality of resentencing that imposed post-release supervi-
sion to their determinate sentences as a violation of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.17  The defendants asserted that 
they had an expectation of finality because they had completed their 
determinate sentences at the time of resentencing and, thus, the resen-
tencing violated the prohibition against multiple punishments.18 
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the resen-
tencing did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the de-
fendants did not have a “legitimate expectation of finality until they 
completed their aggregate sentences.”19  The court stated, the “de-
fendants were resentenced because the sentencing court failed to im-
pose P[ost] R[elease] S[upervision] as part of the original sen-
tence,”20 and courts have an inherent authority to correct illegal 
sentences.21  Under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.40, a 
court may set aside an illegal sentence and resentence the defend-
ant.22  The time limit to resentence is reached when a defendant has 
completed the sentence and an appeal, or the time to appeal, has run 
out.23 
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that their inde-
terminate and determinate sentences must be considered separately.24  
The court found that under Penal Law § 70.30, consecutive and con-
current sentences are aggregated and “thus made into one.”25  Addi-
tionally, the court stated, “a legitimate expectation of finality turns on 
the completion of a sentence.  Where multiple sentences are properly 
aggregated into a single sentence, that expectation arises upon com-
pletion of that sentence.”26  Therefore, the defendants could not have 
had a legitimate expectation of finality because they were still incar-
cerated and serving their aggregate sentences.27  The court stated that 
 
17 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 144. 
18 Id. at 145. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (citing People v. Sparber, 889 N.E.2d 459, 464-65 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that a judge 
must pronounce a defendant’s PRS sentence in open court and a court’s failure to impose 
PRS as part of the original sentence requires resentencing of the defendant to correct the er-
ror)). 
21 Id. at 146 (citing People v. Richardson, 799 N.E.2d 607, 610-11 (N.Y. 2003)). 
22 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 440.40 (McKinney 1970). 
23 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 146. 
24 Id. at 147. 
25 Id. (citing People v. Buss, 900 N.E.2d 964, 966 (N.Y. 2008)). 
26 Id. at 148. 
27 Id. 
3
Cicciaro: Double Jeopardy: A Resentencing Game
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
1124 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
it must presume that the defendants knew their determinate sentences 
were illegal and that they understood their multiple sentences were 
subject to aggregation.28 
The court discussed the case People v. Lingle.29  In Lingle, the 
defendants believed that they had a legitimate expectation of finality 
because they served a “substantial” portion of their original sentenc-
es.30  The court in Lingle rejected the defendants’ arguments and held 
that defendants cannot create a legitimate expectation of finality if 
they have served any time less than the entire sentence.31  Further-
more, “defendants are ‘presumed to be aware that a determinate pris-
on sentence without a term of PRS is illegal’ and subject to correc-
tion, and therefore, ‘cannot claim a legitimate expectation that the 
originally-imposed, improper sentence is final for all purposes.’ ”32 
The court in Brinson also referred to People v. Williams33 in 
its decision.  The five defendants in Williams received determinate 
sentences, completed their incarceration, and were released.34  They 
were then resentenced to impose terms of post-release supervision.35  
The New York Court of Appeals in Williams stated that the prohibi-
tion against multiple punishments “prevents a sentence from being 
increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality 
of the sentence.”36  Moreover, there is a time limit when correcting an 
illegal sentence.37  The court stated in Williams, “there must be a 
temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant.”38  
The court held that under the Double Jeopardy Clause, expectation of 
finality occurs when the defendant completes the sentence and has 
been released from custody.39  Therefore, the court could not impose 
the post-release supervision on the defendants in Williams, as they 
had already been released.40 
 
28 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 147; see People v. Lingle, 949 N.E.2d 952 (N.Y. 2011) (stating 
that the defendants are charged with knowledge of the law). 
29 949 N.E.2d 952 (N.Y. 2011). 
30 Id. at 955. 
31 Id. at 956-57. 
32 Id. at 955-56. 
33 925 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 2010). 
34 Id. at 886. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 888 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135-36 (1980)). 
37 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 146. 
38 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 890. 
39 Id. at 891. 
40 Id. 
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II. FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. Supreme Court 
In United States v. Bozza,41 the Court addressed the resentenc-
ing issue under the Double Jeopardy Clause.42  The defendant’s con-
viction consisted of fines and imprisonment.43  However, when the 
sentence was announced, the trial judge only mentioned imprison-
ment.44  Five hours later, the judge recalled the defendant and advised 
him that the judge failed to impose mandatory fines, and he was, 
therefore, including them at that time for the record.45  The Court 
stated that just because the defendant was before the judge twice in 
one day for sentencing, Double Jeopardy was not invoked.46  The de-
fendant argued that the trial court cannot correct the sentence because 
it would increase his punishment.47  The Court held that when a de-
fendant is convicted based on a verdict, the defendant should not be 
able to escape punishment because the trial court committed an error 
during sentencing.48  Additionally, the Court recognized that “[t]he 
Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in 
which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prison-
er.”49  The Court was only doing what the law required upon convic-
tion, and it “ ‘set aside what it had no authority to do.’ ”50  The Court 
held that the defendant was not put in jeopardy two times for the 
same offense because the corrected sentence “impose[d] a valid pun-
ishment for an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that of-
fense.”51 
In 1980, United States v. DiFrancesco52 was decided.  In this 
case, the defendant was sentenced to eight years for damaging federal 
property and five years for conspiracy, which were to be served con-
 
41 330 U.S. 160 (1947). 
42 Id. at 166. 
43 Id. at 165. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 166-67. 
50 Id. at 167. 
51 Bozza, 330 U.S. at 167. 
52 449 U.S. 117 (1980). 
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currently, as well as one year for unlawful storage, which was to be 
served consecutively with the other sentences.53  The defendant was 
sentenced a month later to two ten year terms for racketeering; those 
terms were to be served concurrently to each other, as well as with 
the previous sentences, thus, resulting in only a one year addition to 
the previous sentences.54  The United States appealed, challenging the 
District Court’s decision to only impose one additional year onto the 
defendant’s sentence as an abuse of discretion.55  The issue before the 
Court was whether the announcement of a sentence created finality 
and conclusiveness.56  The Court found, “[D]ouble [J]eopardy con-
siderations that bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not prohibit re-
view of a sentence.”57  The Court reasoned that the purpose of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent multiple attempts to con-
vict.58  Additionally, the defendant had no expectation of finality until 
the appeal was completed or the time to appeal had run out.59 
DiFrancesco provided that resentencing was not limited to the 
facts of Bozza, where resentencing occurred on the same day as the 
original sentencing, in order to correct the sentence.60  The court in 
DiFrancesco expanded Bozza by holding that “[t]he Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any 
specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will 
turn out to be.”61 
B. Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of expectation of fi-
nality in King v. Cuomo.62  In King, twenty-eight defendants were 
sentenced to determinate terms of imprisonment but post-release su-
pervision was not imposed during sentencing.63  The court held that 
there was no reasonable expectation of finality until the defendants 
 
53 Id. at 122. 
54 Id. at 122-23. 
55 Id. at 125. 
56 Id. at 132. 
57 DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 137. 
61 Id. 
62 King v. Cuomo, 465 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2012). 
63 Id. at 43. 
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had “completed their determinate terms and been released from cus-
tody.”64 
In Williams v. Travis,65 the defendant pled guilty to burglary 
in the second degree and he was sentenced to a three and a half to 
seven year term of imprisonment.66  However, the sentence was ille-
gal because the maximum sentence was double the minimum.67  The 
defendant claimed that the resentencing violated the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.68  The court held that the defendant did not have a legitimate 
expectation of finality because his original sentence was illegal, and 
thus, the defendant’s Double Jeopardy rights were not violated.69  
Furthermore, a legitimate expectation of finality could not be 
achieved because there was still a right to appeal.70 
The Second Circuit also discussed the correction of illegal 
sentences in United States ex rel. Ferrari v. Henderson.71  The de-
fendant was sentenced to a five to fifteen year term of imprisonment, 
as a second felony offender, and a fifteen to thirty year term for first 
degree burglary.72  The sentence was suspended on the remaining two 
counts.73  The prosecutor moved for resentencing on the grounds that 
the indictment was illegal because a conviction for a felony commit-
ted with a weapon may not be suspended.74  The defendant argued 
that his resentencing violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.75  The 
court held that there was no “[D]ouble [J]eopardy problem here since 
the correction of an illegal sentence by the imposition of a legal sen-
tence, even when this increases punishment, cannot be considered as 
multiple punishment for the same offense.”76 
 
64 Id. at 45. 
65 143 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998). 
66 Id. at 98. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 99. 
69 Id. 
70 Travis, 143 F.3d at 99. 
71 474 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1973). 
72 Id. at 511. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 513. 
76 Henderson, 474 F.2d at 513. 
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C. Other Circuit Court of Appeals 
Although the case of United States v. Welch77 is not binding 
on the Second Circuit, it does have persuasive value.  The defendant 
was convicted and sentenced on four counts of possession of stolen 
mail.78  He was sentenced to four years imprisonment on count one, 
to run consecutively with three year terms for counts two, three and 
four which were to run concurrent with each other.79  On appeal, the 
defendant’s sentence was modified to one conviction and remanded 
for resentencing.80  Then, the defendant was resentenced to five years 
imprisonment.81  The defendant claimed that his Double Jeopardy 
rights were violated when the court imposed a sentence that was larg-
er than the maximum imposed for a single count at the initial sentenc-
ing.82  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant did 
not have a legitimate expectation of finality because his original sen-
tence was illegal.83  Therefore, the defendant’s Double Jeopardy 
rights were not violated.84 
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provides per-
suasive authority in United States v. Warner.85  At sentencing, the 
court failed to impose a special parole term that was required “when-
ever a defendant with a prior conviction is sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment.”86  The court held that there was no Double Jeopardy 
claim because an amended sentence adding a mandatory parole term 
is not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.87 
D. United States District Courts 
In Johnson v. New York,88 the defendant was sentenced in 
1999 to a term of five and a half to eleven years for criminal posses-
sion of a controlled substance and a one year term for resisting arrest, 
 
77 928 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1991). 
78 Id. at 915. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 916. 
82 Welch, 928 F.2d at 916. 
83 Id. at 917. 
84 Id. 
85 690 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1982). 
86 Id. at 555. 
87 Id. 
88 851 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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which were to run concurrently.89  Additionally, the defendant had a 
prior undischarged sentence for a parole violation of twenty-four 
months, but the court did not specify whether this sentence was to run 
concurrently or consecutively.90  The DOCS administered the de-
fendant’s 1999 sentence to run concurrently with the undischarged 
sentence.91  However, the initial calculation of the DOCS was invalid 
because, according to the statute, the defendant’s 1999 sentence was 
required to run consecutively with his undischarged sentence.92  The 
defendant was resentenced to serve his 1999 sentence and his undis-
charged sentence consecutively.93  The defendant claimed that he had 
a legitimate expectation of finality of his sentences running concur-
rently and the resentencing enhanced his sentence and violated his 
Double Jeopardy rights.94  The court rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment because the court did not enhance or lengthen his original sen-
tence.95  The court held that “the Trial Court imposed the same sen-
tence that, under New York law, it was deemed to have imposed at 
his original sentencing.”96 
In Warren v. Rock,97 the defendant’s original sentence did not 
include the mandatory post-release supervision.98  When the court 
discovered the error, it resentenced the defendant in order to correct 
the sentence.99  The court held that although resentencing occurred 
more than seven years after the original sentencing, it did not violate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.100  The court reasoned that “[t]he Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause prohibits altering a previously imposed sentence 
if the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in his original 
sentence . . . but where no such expectation exists, [D]ouble 
[J]eopardy does not bar a court from modifying a sentence.”101  The 
court in Warren cited Williams for the proposition that “defendants 
 




93 Johnson, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 718. 
94 Id. at 723. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 No. 12-CV-3101, 2012 WL 2421916 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012). 
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who have not yet completed their imposed sentences ‘cannot acquire 
a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which is illegal, be-
cause such a sentence remains subject to modification.’ ”102  The 
court found that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation 
of finality in his illegal original sentence because at the time of resen-
tencing when the post-release supervision was added he was still in-
carcerated.103  “[T]hus the re-sentencing to correct the sentencing 
judge’s original oversight did not violate Warren’s double jeopardy 
rights.”104 
III. STATE APPROACH 
The New York Constitution states in Article 1, § 6, that “[n]o 
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense.”105  Until 2010, when the New York Court of Appeals decided 
Williams, New York courts followed the precedent established in 
DiFrancesco to resolve the issue of Double Jeopardy in resentencing 
cases.106  Since 2010, New York courts have followed the precedent 
set forth in Williams to analyze expectation of finality for the purpose 
of resentencing.107  The New York Court of Appeals believed the rul-
ing in Williams “promotes clarity, certainty and fairness.”108 
A. New York Court of Appeals 
In People v. Minaya,109 the defendant agreed to a plea bargain 
of an eight year sentence for attempted robbery in the first degree.110  
During sentencing, the court announced that it would follow the plea 
bargain.111  However, when the sentence was pronounced, the court 
stated that the defendant’s maximum term was three years instead of 
 
102 Warren, 2012 WL 2421916, at *2. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
106 See, e.g., People v. Minaya, 429 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (N.Y. 1981); Williams, 925 N.E.2d 
at 888 (stating that the court in DiFrancesco “held that the protection against multiple pun-
ishments prevents a sentence from being increased once the defendant has a legitimate ex-
pectation of finality of the sentence.”). 
107 See, e.g., Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 955-56; Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 146. 
108 Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 956. 
109 429 N.E.2d 1161 (N.Y. 1981). 
110 Id. at 1162. 
111 Id. 
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eight years.112  The error was noticed when the prosecutor discussed 
pleas with the codefendants.113  At an informal hearing, the court 
concluded that the pronouncement of the three year sentence was er-
roneous and stated, “the sentence is now corrected.”114  The Appellate 
Division reversed the correction on appeal and reinstated the three 
year sentence.115  The decision noted that courts have the inherent 
power to correct sentences; however, the defendant’s sentence in this 
case was not correctable because the “imposition of judgment enlarg-
ing the time to be served by defendant is a matter of substance not 
form.”116  The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and 
stated that the court’s inherent power to correct statements or even 
formal pronouncements permits the court to correct an error such as 
the one in this case.117  The court held, “there is no basis for conclud-
ing that the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause posed any impediment to 
the court’s power to correct the error in the sentence.”118 
In People v. Sparber,119 there were five defendants: Sparber, 
Thomas, Lingle, Rodriguez and Ware.120  Defendant Sparber pled 
guilty to first degree assault for a fifteen year sentence and was adju-
dicated as a second violent felony offender.121  At sentencing, the 
court pronounced the determinate term of fifteen years but did not 
mention the mandatory five year post-release supervision term.122  
Defendant Thomas was sentenced to a fifteen year aggregate term as 
a second violent felony offender for aggravated assault on a police 
officer and sex crimes involving a minor, but the court failed to pro-
nounce post-release supervision at sentencing.123  Defendant Lingle 
was sentenced to a determinate sentence of fourteen years as a second 
violent felony offender for arson and an indeterminate sentence of 




114 Minaya, 429 N.E.2d at 1162. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1163. 
118 Id. at 1164. 
119 889 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2008). 
120 Id. at 461. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 462. 
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terminate sentence for reckless endangerment.124  At sentencing, 
mandatory post-release supervision was not pronounced.125  Defend-
ant Rodriguez was sentenced to the maximum of twenty five years 
for gang assault in the first degree.126  The last defendant, Ware, was 
sentenced to three determinate terms of fourteen years to run concur-
rently for attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted assault in 
the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second 
degree, for which a term of post-release supervision was not im-
posed.127  In all five defendants’ cases, although the mandatory post-
release supervision term was not imposed at sentencing, it was in-
cluded on the court worksheet.128  The court stated that the error of 
the sentencing court “can be remedied through resentencing.  Nothing 
more is required.”129  The court recognized that notes on a worksheet 
recorded outside of the defendants’ presence cannot satisfy the man-
date of post-release supervision and errors can only be corrected 
when the defendant was present.130  Additionally, the court found that 
“the sole remedy for a procedural error as this is to vacate the sen-
tence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can 
make the required pronouncement.”131  Thus, only a procedural error 
is made when the required sentence is not pronounced, and it can eas-
ily be remedied by remitting the case back to the sentencing court in 
order to pronounce the post-release supervision term.132 
In 2010, Williams was decided by the New York Court of 
Appeals.  As previously stated, the defendants completed their de-
terminate sentences, and they were released.133  Thereafter, they were 
resentenced to impose post-release supervision terms.134  In Williams, 
the New York Court of Appeals defined when a defendant has a legit-
imate expectation of finality.135  The court held: 
once a defendant is released from custody and returns 
 
124 Sparber, 889 N.E.2d at 462-63. 
125 Id. at 463. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 461, 463. 
129 Sparber, 889 N.E.2d at 464. 
130 Id. at 465. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 466. 
133 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 886. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 891. 
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to the community after serving the period of incarcera-
tion that was ordered by the sentencing court . . . there 
is a legitimate expectation that the sentence, although 
illegal under the Penal Law, is final and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prevents a court from modifying the 
sentence to include a period of post[-]release supervi-
sion.136 
One year later, when Lingle was before of the New York 
Court of Appeals, the court employed its holding in Williams to de-
termine whether the defendants had a legitimate expectation of finali-
ty.137  The defendants served “substantial” portions of their originally 
imposed sentences.138  The court held consistently with its decision in 
Williams and rejected the defendants’ argument that completing a 
“substantial” portion of their sentences was a basis for a legitimate 
expectation of finality.139 
B. New York Appellate Division 
In People v. Smith,140 the defendant was sentenced in 2000 to 
determinate terms of eleven years for robbery in the second degree on 
each of two counts, two years for grand larceny in the fourth degree, 
and one year for criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth 
degree, which were to run concurrently with each other.141  Post-
release supervision was not pronounced by the sentencing court.142  
The defendant, while incarcerated in 2005, was sentenced to an inde-
terminate term of two to four years for promoting prison contraband 
in the first degree, which was to run consecutively with his previous 
sentences.143  Then, in 2010, the defendant was sentenced to another 
one and a half to three years for promoting prison contraband, which 
was to run consecutively with his other sentences.144  The defendant 
was incarcerated for eleven years when he was resentenced for his 
 
136 Id. 
137 Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 955-56. 
138 Id. at 955. 
139 Id. 
140 955 N.Y.S.2d 373 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012). 
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robbery in the second degree convictions to include a term of post-
release supervision.145  The court held that the resentencing did not 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.146  It used the reasoning from the 
court in Williams stating “[s]ince the defendant was still serving this 
single, combined sentence at the time of the resentencing, and had 
not yet been released from prison, he did not have a legitimate expec-
tation of finality.”147 
Furthermore, in People v. Scott,148 the defendant was sen-
tenced to determinate terms of ten years for attempted rape in the first 
degree and seven years for assault in the second degree, which were 
to run concurrently.149  However, the required post-release supervi-
sion was not imposed by the sentencing court.150  The court held that, 
in accordance with the decision in Williams, resentencing the defend-
ant to include the post-release supervision term did not put him in 
Double Jeopardy because he had not been released from incarceration 
of his original sentence.151 
C. New York Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court of New York, Queens County faced the 
issue of resentencing a defendant in order to impose the mandatory 
post-release supervision to the original sentence in People v. Wells.152  
The defendant was a second felony offender who was sentenced to 
three determinate terms of ten years for one count of robbery in the 
first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree, which 
were to run concurrently.153  Additionally, the defendant was sen-
tenced to indeterminate terms of three and a half to seven years for 
criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and one and 
a half to three years for criminal possession of stolen property in the 
fourth degree, which were to run concurrently, as well as a one year 
determinate sentence for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.154  
 
145 Smith, 955 N.Y.S.2d at 374. 
146 Id. at 374-75. 
147 Id. at 375. 
148 917 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011). 
149 Id. at 294. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 903 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
153 Id. at 704. 
154 Id. 
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When the defendant was originally sentenced, the court did not im-
pose a term of post-release supervision for the determinate sentenc-
es.155  In October of 2009, the defendant was supposed to be resen-
tenced.156  The defendant filed a motion opposing the resentencing 
because he claimed that he had a legitimate expectation of finality 
and resentencing to impose post-release supervision violated his 
Double Jeopardy rights.157  The defendant was conditionally released 
from incarceration in November of 2009, and his maximum expira-
tion date would have been in April of 2011.158  In December of 2009, 
the court denied the defendant’s motion and held that he “did not 
have a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence” be-
cause “PRS [post-release supervision] is a mandatory component of 
all determinate prison sentences, a sentence imposed without PRS 
would be unauthorized [and] illegal; hence, a defendant could not 
have a legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.”159  
The court resentenced the defendant and imposed the post-release su-
pervision term of five years.160  The defendant moved for the order to 
be vacated.161 
The court distinguished Wells from Williams.162  In Williams, 
the defendants were beyond the maximum expiration dates of their 
original sentences when they were resentenced; whereas, in this case, 
the defendant was resentenced in December of 2009, and his maxi-
mum expiration date was not until April of 2011.163  The court stated 
that there were no decisions from the Appellate Division regarding 
imposition of post-release supervision on a defendant who was condi-
tionally released from prison, served his initial sentence, completed 
the direct appeal and the time for appeal has expired, but the maxi-
mum expiration date of the originally imposed sentence was not 
reached.164  The court held, in accordance with the Williams decision, 
that the defendant’s Double Jeopardy rights attached on the date in 








161 Id. at 703. 
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2009.165  Thus, it was improper to resentence the defendant to impose 
post-release supervision in December of 2009.166  The court reasoned 
that the defendant was “entitled to the same constitutional rights as 
other defendants whose maximum expiration dates have passed.”167 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After evaluating the federal approach and the New York State 
approach on resentencing under the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the court in Brinson followed the proper 
precedent when determining whether resentencing a defendant to im-
pose a term of mandatory post-release supervision to the original ille-
gal determinate sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Brinson was not a case of first impression.  There 
were several questions in which the court in Brinson looked to both 
federal courts and state courts for answers.  The Brinson case is im-
portant because the court sets out the precedent for resentencing de-
fendants who were serving illegal determinate sentences that did not 
include a period of post-release supervision in New York. 
The defendants in Brinson were resentenced because the sen-
tencing court failed to include a term of post-release supervision with 
their original illegal determinate sentences.168  The court cited 
Sparber as authority to conclude that when a required sentence is not 
pronounced during sentencing, the error can be corrected by pro-
nouncing it in the presence of the defendant at resentencing.169  The 
court in Brinson also “presume[d] [the] defendants knew that their 
determinate sentences were illegal, and that they knew they were sub-
ject to resentencing until such time as they completed their respective 
sentences,” which was in accordance with Lingle.170  The court in this 
case, unlike Williams, took into consideration that the originally im-
posed sentences were illegal and the defendants were presumed to 
know of the illegality.171 
Furthermore, the court in Brinson followed Richardson and 
 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 705-06. 
167 Wells, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
168 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d 145.  
169 Sparber, 889 N.E.2d at 464-66.  
170 Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 955- 57. 
171 Id. 
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stated “courts have an inherent authority to correct illegal sentenc-
es.”172  Richardson cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Bozza for 
their authority for correcting illegal sentences.173  Other courts have 
continuously followed the precedent set in Bozza.  The court in Hen-
derson stated that correcting an illegal sentence by imposing a legal 
one is not a multiple punishment for the same offense.174  The New 
York Court of Appeals stayed consistent with the federal precedent in 
Minaya.  Even though the facts of Minaya are slightly different in 
which the resentencing of the defendant increased his sentence, the 
court still came to the same conclusion that the court’s power to cor-
rect an error does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.175 
The final and most important issue in Brinson was whether 
the defendants had a legitimate expectation of finality.  The court 
used Williams’ reasoning that a legitimate expectation of finality 
cannot be achieved unless the defendant has completed the imposed 
sentence.176  Many other courts have used this reasoning to determine 
when a legitimate expectation of finality has been achieved.  The Se-
cond Circuit answered the issue in King.  The facts of King are anal-
ogous to Brinson and the courts both held the defendants would not 
have a reasonable expectation of finality until they had completed 
their determinate terms and had been released.177  Additionally, the 
New York Appellate Division, in Smith and Scott, also ruled on the 
issue of legitimate expectation of finality.  The court’s holding in 
Brinson was consistent with the holdings in Smith and Scott.178  These 
cases establish that the courts consistently apply the same test to de-
termine legitimate expectation consistently. 
Even though the United States Supreme Court has not ruled 
on whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality when 
he or she is still serving the originally imposed illegal sentence, there 
is consistency among the federal and the state courts.  Ultimately, the 
New York Court of Appeals decision in Brinson applied the proper 
precedent and found the defendants’ Double Jeopardy rights were not 
violated. 
 
172 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 145-46.  
173 Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166-67.  
174 Henderson, 474 F.2d at 513.  
175 Minaya, 429 N.E.2d at 1162-64.  
176 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 148.  
177 Id. at 145; King, 465 F. App’x at 45.  
178 Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 145; Smith, 955 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75; Scott, 917 N.Y.S.2d at 
294. 
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